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【論　文】
日本語要旨：
　日本では「住宅品質確保法」によって新築住宅の 10 年間の補償が住宅事業者に義務付け
られている．住宅に瑕疵（欠陥）が見つかった場合には，事業者は無料で修理する瑕疵担保
責任を負う．2009 年 1 月施行の「住宅瑕疵担保責任法」は，事業者が保証金を預けておい
たり，住宅瑕疵担保責任保険（住宅かし保険）に加入することによって，倒産した場合でも，
欠陥を修理するための資金を確保することを義務付けた．住宅瑕疵担保責任保険は国土交通
省から指定された住宅専門の保険会社 5 社が引き受けを行い，損害保険会社が再保険を担
う．住宅専門の保険会社は建築の各段階における検査を行う．こうした我が国固有の制度に
はメリットとデメリットがある．
SUMMARY 
  In Japan, housing suppliers’ 10-year warranty［1］ towards buyer is compulsory since 2000. 
Considering the possibility of suppliers’ bankruptcy and insolvency, housing warranty has 
been designed by the Special Law on Fulfi llment of Housing Warranty and Quality［2］ voted 
on May 30th 2007 and implemented on October 1st 2009. Under this law, the seller/
contractor can either make a deposit in a specifi c Government account or subscribe a 
Housing Warranty Insurance. This insurance cover is sold by MLIT［3］ – approved Insurance 
Entities［4］, in charge of on-site inspections during the construction process. These entities 
reinsure themselves with the General Insurance Companies which are monitored by the 
independent Financial Services Agency (FSA［5］). The fact that some of the General Insurance 
Companies are shareholders of the Insurance Entities they reinsure and also the existence 
of a not-so-transparent but compulsory reinsurance pool where all the General Insurance 
Companies mutualize such reinsurance business may entice the effort to explore the partic-
ular merits and demerits of this rather unique Japanese insurance and reinsurance system.
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INTRODUCTION
 Construction is one of the most prominent 
economic sectors in any given economy, its 
dynamics being directly entangled with the 
whole economy’s momentum. Accession to 
ownership through household savings is 
among the best indicators of a stable real 
economy, fueling domestic demand and use of 
local manpower. In most countries, the 
dwelling construction market is usually split 
between a league table of a small number of 
large construction companies and a very large 
number of middle size and tiny contractors, 
incorporators. 
 In addition to the technical risks［6］ 
inherent to the construction process and the 
need to properly follow appropriate construc-
tion processes, may arise the risk of failure of 
contractors of any size. Such failure risk is 
indeed featuring high amongst the factors 
that may lead to a sharp loss for the contrac-
tors’ client. Thousands of hopeful, hard saving, 
or borrowing households may instantly turn 
ruined and desperate. Thus the need for 
construction warranty insurance cover and its 
reinsurance. 
 In any given country, would arise one 
case of large scale failure of large construc-
tion company, or even worries among the 
public and/or the media for such event, the 
whole sector may prove under stringent 
hardship as regards public confidence. 
Sometimes to such extent, the authorities 
may have to intervene, taking proper, some-
times harsh, decisions and making them 
publicly known. The purpose being to avoid 
political embarrassment, to restore conﬁ dence 
in the sector and thus, help the real economy 
keep some of its momentum. Putting at risk 
the legitimate wish of the hard working, hard 
saving middle-class households to turn them-
selves into owners of a brand new home is 
also of considerable political cost. 
 Japan, often depicted (or sometimes self-
proclaimed) as a one-of-kind country, economy 
and society, is somehow a newcomer to such 
insurance and reinsurance model, the current 
system being, in 2012, less than 5 years old. 
 As it is most often the case in Japan, 
research, including knowledge and analysis of 
prominent foreign countries solutions has 
taken place before the selection of the design 
deemed the best for Japan’s interest. 
Consecutive to the vote of the new law on 
May 30th 2007 and its inception on October 
1st 2009, the new framework has been imple-
mented, with the whole set of its main 
features: public sector supervision, risk 
management design, private stakeholders, 
on-site risk inspection, regulation and reinsur-
ance.
1. ORIGIN OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM & 
TRANSITION TOWARD THE CURRENT ONE
 The current Japanese wording of this 
Insurance is Jûtaku Hanbai Kashi Tampo 
Sekinin Hoken （住宅販売瑕疵担保責任保険）, 
which means “Insurance for Responsibility in 
Case of Defect of Housing Sold”. It is 
commonly called Jûtaku Kashi Hoken（住宅か
し保険）. The origin of the current insurance 
being the Japanese house warranty［7］ (thus 
the old system［8］), dating back to the 1980, as 
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a voluntary insurance system. 
 Since Year 2000, builders has been legally 
compelled to give a 10-year warranty for new 
houses. 
1.1 Transition between the old and the new 
system
⑴ The Aneha Scandal, November 2005
 Mr. Hidetsugu Aneha, a Japanese First 
Class architect, was convicted for falsifying 
data for 71 buildings out of the 208 he 
designed. The falsiﬁ cation concerned earth-
quake resistance, in order to reduce costs. 
The media and political impact of such 
scandal, in a matter mixing both safety (in 
particular against earthquake) and dwellings 
drew a crisis of conﬁ dence of the Japanese 
people towards the ability of the Japanese 
authorities to enforce safety and construction 
quality. 
 In front of the Japanese Diet, Mr. Aneha 
alleged being under pressure to save cost, 
from the one construction company, who 
represented 90% of his business. He also 
questioned the role played by safety inspec-
tors who did not detect such defect that Mr. 
Aneha considered as easy to spot. The 
massive energy transmitted by an earth-
quake to any construction in Japan, requires 
particularly dire technical standards, resulting 
in the issuance of an average 300-page strong 
technical report. Detecting such a fraud may 
not be as easy as stated by Mr. Aneha (in 
particular when the inspectors are not aware 
they should spot voluntary defects in the 
report), but the cost and consequences were 
indeed tremendous.
 One of the developers, also investigated 
during the scandal, rejected his own guilt, 
saying that he received inappropriate design 
from a crooked architect. 
 Finally, Mr. Aneha went to prison, ﬂ at 
owners had to leave ill-built dwellings, some 
hotels had to close and some real estate and 
construction companies went to bankruptcy. 
 Unfortunate clients lost everything and 
could not get any compensation from bank-
rupt dwellings providers. There was an 
obvious hole in the legal system, as to guar-
antee some protection to honest dwelling 
buyers left with nothing, when victims of 
architect’s malpractice, including voluntary. 
⑵ Response from the Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, Transport & Tourism［9］ 
 The Japanese public opinion was truly 
shocked, since the Kobe earthquake occurred 
just 10 years before, with a fatality over 
6,000. In Kobe, the aerial speedways 
supposed to be used for emergency service in 
such instances fell on the ground, due to 
substandard quality of material...
 Response to the Aneha scandal had to be 
a public one, since Japanese the Japanese 
Diet took the matter into their hands, under 
tremendous scrutiny for the media. 
 Thus, for this purpose, and through the 
thrust of Japanese Parliament, -the Ministry 
of Land and Transport (MLIT) did propose a 
new legal frame, gathering a kenkyûkai 
(research committee) for reform. This 
Committee, as- it is usually done in such 
instance in Japan, did-congregate government 
experts, academics and representatives of 
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private sector’s interested parties. 
⑶ The opinion of the regular General 
Insurers of Japan
 Whilst all other interested parties from 
the private sector were linked whatsoever to 
an area under the scope of the Ministry of 
Construction, the regular insurers (meaning 
under the scope of the Financial Services 
Agency) were asked to contribute by 
expressing of their position. They indeed 
contributed through the General Insurance 
Association of Japan (GIAJ［11］), who provided 
a position paper［12］, dated July 18th 2006.
 GIAJ was obviously not enthusiastic at all 
with the pool solution［13］ and insisted on two 
main points: 1) each risk should be assessed 
by the insurers who will actually carry the 
risks (the General Insurer regulated by the 
FSA) and 2) the necessity to protect capacity. 
 The GIAJ position paper suggests, 
contrary to the pool system, that each indi-
vidual contractor and project should get its 
own cover limits, based on each contractor’s 
individual risk proﬁ le. In addition, GIAJ 
informed that they do not consider as proper 
that the entity［14］ in charge of providing cover 
(the Housing Warranty Insurance Entities) be 
owned or being in any kind of connection 
with the inspection business.
 The Research Committee （研究会
kenkyûkai） work led to a new legal frame-
work, implemented as of October 1st. 2009.
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM
2.1 CONSTRUCTION WARRANTY INSURANCE 
SYSTEM
⑴ Current system
 The current system has been imple-
mented on October 1st. 2009, through the May 
30th 2007 Law［15］ and the related decrees.
 The purpose is to provide a compulsory 
liability insurance cover, in order to back the 
home suppliers’ own legal 10-year warranty［16］. 
The insured objects are dwellings, either 
detached house (usually a wooden structure
（木造mokuzo） in Japan, or ﬂ ats in a residen-
tial building［17］. 
 Under the law, the seller/contractor has 
to provide a speciﬁ c external warranty to the 
buyer, in case of defect. The seller/
contractor can either make a deposit in a 
speciﬁ c governmental account (this option is 
usually selected by large companies with 
large capital, able and willing to avoid the 
insurance cost) or provide with a speciﬁ c 
insurance (which is the case for most small 
and mid-size sellers/contractors (conversely, 
for the opposite reasons). Which means that 
the insurance is compulsory only when a 
speciﬁ c deposit has not been made. 
 The big builders are 1% of the total 
number of the builders (thus 99% are small 
and mid-size builders), whilst 46% of new 
house sales are protected through the 
warranted deposits (State) system, and 54% 
by the house warranty insurance［18］. 
⑵ Design
 The Housing Warranty Insurance design 
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is shown on Figure 1:
 The insurance cover is sold to seller/
contractor (also called builder or housing 
supplier) by the MLIT-approved Housing 
Warranty Insurance Entities, also in charge of 
technical on-site inspections. These House 
Warranty Insurance Entities reinsure them-
selves (fully or almost fully) with General 
insurance companies［19］, who need to get a 
special license for entering such business. 
⑶ “Reinsurance” of entities by regular 
General Insurance Compagnies
 On their turn, these regular insurance 
companies “reinsure” themselves with a 
Japanese domestic special-purpose pool, 
housed and managed by Toa Re. (See 
“Reinsurance”, infra).
⑷ On-site inspection
 The current system, in order to avoid 
repeating the criticism brought by the Aneha 
scandal provides the obligation of on-site 
inspections during the construction process. 
 Inspection are made by MLIT-approved 
House Warranty Insurance Entities them-
selves. 
 Such inspection process follows the rule 
exposed on Table 1 below:
 For contractors who have applied for 
construction performance evaluation under 
the Housing Quality Assurance Law, the 
on-site inspection is only made once irrespec-
tive to the number of ﬂ oor. 
⑸ parts covered by the guarantee insurance
 The insurance covers the parts shown on 
Figure 2:
⑹ Insurance premium
 The insurance premium varies among the 
5 entities, but the price setting is made out of 
those following basic parameters:
 a)  type of residence: detached house or 
apartment,
 b)  type of construction: wooden structure 
or not,
 c)  insured capital: the legal basic amount 
insured is ¥20 million, but usually 
extra capital can be covered, for an 
extra fee
 d)  area of the residence. A price schedule 
usually exists, starting from 40㎡ or 
less, up to 100㎡ or more, with 
various brackets for flats. The 
schedule starts from 100㎡ for houses. 
 e)  Inspection fee are always added to the 
insurance premium, with separate fee 
schedule,
 f)  Insurance premium is tax free, whilst 
inspection fee are taxable,
 g)  Number of inspections may vary 
according to the number of ﬂ oors, the 
type of structure, other factors,
 h)  Example of insurance premium, 
(Entity: J Anshin), in the case of a120
㎡ dwelling, in a wooden-structure 
residence building, limited to 2 stories, 
for a (basic) insured capital of ¥20 
million. 
  Insurance premium: ¥49,170
  ＋ Inspection fees:  ¥28,350
 Total:  ¥77,520
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⑺ Cost covered:
 a)  Repair
 b)  Legal expenses, with prior consent of 
entity
 c)  Investigation fee to decide proper 
repair work
 d)  temporary accommodation and removal
⑻ Insured capital: 
 Up to ¥20 million, for either a detached 
house or an apartment unit. (For insured 
capital above this amount: 30, 40 or ¥50 
million, an optional contract is available, 
premium informed on demand. In which 
instance, the maximum payment for negli-
gence or intentional act is up to ¥20 million).
⑼ Investigation fee (example):
-  for detached houses: the larger between 
10% of repair cost or ¥100,000 per 
house, (up to ¥500,000 per event);
-  for apartment units: the larger between 
10% of repair cost or ¥100,000 per 
building, (up to ¥2,000,000 per event).
⑽ Temporary Accommodation and Removal 
Expenses: 
 Either detached house or housing building 
unit: ¥500,000 (per house, or per unit).
⑾ Claim settlement
 This aspect is the one providing the 
beneﬁ t for the consumer, with reasonable 
limitations for protecting the insurer, rein-
surer (regular non-life insurer and the rein-
surance pool.
 a)  Unitary basic insured capital is ¥20 
million. (This amount is the one for 
the compulsory insurance. Optional, 
additional capital cover may be avail-
able, on a case-by-case basis). 
 b)  Maximum payment per housing 
supplier per fiscal year［20］: ¥2.5 
billion.
   This is to avoid a serial eﬀ ect 
concerning a single supplier (as was 
the case in the Aneha scandal).
 c)  Deductible: ¥100,000 (paid by housing 
supplier). 
   The purpose of deductible is to avoid 
small and numerous small claims, thus 
inducing the housing supplier to settle 
them［21］. 
 d)  Coverage ratio in case of bankruptcy 
of housing supplier: 100%, less deduct-
ible, all other cases: 80%, less deduct-
ible. 
   This feature conﬁ rms the original 
purpose of this insurance, which is to 
protect the consumer in case of 
failure of the supplier.
 e)  Insurance payment formula: Insurance 
payment ＝ (Amount of damage ‒ 
Deductible) × Deducted Portion of 
Compensation
 f)  Multiple beneﬁ ciaries and/or multiple 
insurers
   For an apartment building, right to 
claim shall be exercised by the owner 
of each unit in the building.
   In case were some housing unit (s) is 
(are) in the same apartment building 
are not covered by the same insur-
ance, insurance payments will be 
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calculated based on the proportion of 
the area of insured units (insured 
through the same insurer) to that of 
the total number of units. 
 g)  Exclusions:
 -  Natural disasters such as ﬂ oods and 
typhoons or ﬁ res, lightning strikes, 
explosions or others “Acts of God”; 
 -  Subsidence, upheaval, movement, oscil-
lation or softening of land, landslide, 
outﬂ ow or inﬂ ow of soil or other 
defects caused by land formation 
works;
 -  Worm-eaten, wear and tear or deterio-
ration not due to construction defects; 
 -  Signiﬁ cantly improper use or mainte-
nance of the house; 
 -  Defects of the work or parts that have 
undergone expansion, remodeling or 
repair work; 
 -  Burnout, loss, effluence or other 
damages caused by earthquakes, erup-
tions or tsunami.
 h) Speciﬁ c Relief Fund［22］ 
 In case of gross negligence or afore-
thought, there is a speciﬁ c Relief Fund, 
managed by the Association of Housing 
Warranty Liability Insurance (Housing 
Insurance Warranty Entities). 
 Only in case when a housing supplier 
(insured) is unable to carry his/her liability 
for certain period of time due to bankruptcy 
or other reasons, an accident resulting from 
“gross negligence or aforethought of a 
housing supplier, owner of the house, parties 
involved with construction work, design work, 
supervision of construction work, soil survey 
or soil reinforcement work by contracts or 
persons who have a contract of employment 
with any of those parties can be insured. The 
payment will be made directly to the home-
owner from the Relief Fund. This Fund is 
linked to the Association of Housing 
Warranty Liability Insurers (entities). This 
Fund is diﬀ erent from the Relief Fund in 
case of Earthquake. 
⑿ Serial losses 
 Serial losses caused by the same defect 
are treated as a single loss. 
 This feature is a stop-loss to avoid serial 
claims.
2.2 THE REINSURANCE POOL SYSTEM
 No speciﬁ c literature seems available 
about the pool system. It has been possible to 
meet persons in charge at General Insurance 
Companies that are pool members, but it has 
not been made possible to meet directly with 
people in charge of operating the pool itself.
 The ELC (Expected Loss Cost) pool is 
administered by Toa Re, which seems to play 
the role of a custodian. The pure reinsurance 
function, with is the ultimate risk covering, of 
the pool seems to rest with the pool 
members, i.e. the General insurance compa-
nies. These insurance companies must have 
applied for and obtained a speciﬁ c license［23］ 
to operate in the House Warranty (de facto) 
reinsurance branch. Toa Re may also partici-
pate to the pool as one among the other 
members, possibly with a rather small share 
(again, nothing seems to have been published 
on the matter). 
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 All information thus has been obtained 
from secondary sources. This situation comes 
the fact that the pool system is not a part of 
the legal frame of the original law. The ﬁ rst 
ceding process, between the (MLIT-approved) 
Housing Warranty Insurance Entities and the 
regular, FSA-approved General Insurance 
Companies (which, in addition, must get a 
speciﬁ c license to accept such risk) is called 
reinsurance, but basically means that such 
entities do not retain any risk, or very little. 
Therefore, it is not totally wrong to consider 
that the real risk carriers are the General 
Insurance companies, which “reinsure” the 
entities’ portfolios.
 Instead, the pool is more a voluntary (or 
self-imposed) design, considered and recom-
mended by kenkyûkai (Research Group) set up 
by the MLIT to design the then new law. 
The absence of retrocession and the pro-rata 
share of allocating risk taking and loss settle-
ment, results in a functioning where General 
Insurance Companies pool members (to the 
number of 10-15 compagnies, according to 
some informant), mutualize their risk between 
themselves mirroring the one of a de facto 
syndication system. Such is the result of the 
situation when the subscription of each risk is 
made by one party (the Entity) that will not 
truly bear the risk (the General Insurance 
Company instead, will). 
 The risk the pool is carrying is indeed the 
reinsurance of the House Warranty Insurance 
Entities, within its compulsory design (the one 
above depicted, including the exclusion and 
the single loss feature). 
The main features of the reinsurance pool are 
unfortunately not to be revealed to third 
parties, for lack of authorization from infor-
mant. 
3.  PLAYERS, STAKEHOLDERS AND 
ENVIRONMENT
3.1 THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
⑴ The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and 
Tourism (MLIT)
 The organization of the Ministry, as far 
as the Housing Warranty Insurance is 
concerned is shown on Figure 3.
⑵ The Financial Services Agency
 The FSA is involved as the monitoring 
authority providing the speciﬁ c licensing 
allowing General insurers authorized in Japan, 
to get access to this speciﬁ c line of insurance 
(indeed reinsurance of the portfolio the House 
Warranty Insurance Entities). Getting such 
license provides (imposes?) the membership of 
the reinsurance pool. FSA has not been on 
the list of the institutions to be visited, since 
the direct insurance entities are under the 
monitoring of the Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism 
(MLIT) 
3.2 THE HOUSE WARRANTY INSURANCE 
ENTITIES
 These entities are represented by the 
Association of Housing Warranty Insurance. 
 This Association (created in December 
2008) provides, among other things, a charac-
terization of its MLIT-monitored members 
(the House Warranty Insurance Entities), 
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which is shown on Table 2:
3.3 THE GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANIES 
 Most of the most prominent of them are 
involved in this construction insurance 
modality as reinsurer of the entities (some of 
these General insurance companies may held 
some stakes in the capital of some entities), 
being then both shareholders and reinsurers 
at the same time). All prominent Japanese 
General insurance companies are known as 
pool members, such as, for instance, Tokio 
Marine, Aioi, Mitsui-Sumitono...
3.4 THE TOA RE AND THE REINSURANCE POOL
  These are the great absentees of this 
report. Toa Re［24］ is the sole Japanese rein-
surer. A rather discreet company, they were 
unfortunately not available for providing 
information on the reinsurance pool of the 
Japanese construction warranty insurance.
3.5 GLOBAL PLAYERS IN INSURANCE AND 
REINSURANCE
 Apart from Allianz (which bailed out in 
2011) from the direct insurance side, there is 
no apparent interest in such market from 
abroad.
3.6 FACTORS OF ENVIRONMENT: LEGAL, 
AND OTHER ASPECTS.
⑴ Legal
 In the current design, the legal system in 
force is involving two ministries: 
 a)  the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, 
Transport and Tourism, in charge of 
regulating the whole construction 
industry, among which, the inspection 
companies, and the Housing Warranty 
Insurance Entities, which some, 
among the ﬁ ve in activity, are gotten 
both licenses.
 b)  the FSA. Since the entities are not real 
insurance companies and are ceding 
almost all their risks to the General 
Insurance Companies, the real insur-
ance business and legal monitoring, on 
a technical side, is resting with the 
FSA. Thus, the General Insurance 
Companies acting as reinsurers (the 
only role they can play since they 
cannot operate as insurers) must get a 
FSA ad hoc license in order to be 
authorized to accept MILT-licensed 
Housing Warranty Insurer’s risk as 
reinsurers. 
   Getting such license from the FSA 
authorizes the licensed General 
Insurance insurer to become a 
member of the pool, in order to get 
retrocession and risk mitigation.
   The pool does not seems to have any 
speciﬁ c legal framework, so the pool 
certainly operates in some regular 
legal framework, In such case, there is 
a real diﬃ  culty to get public informa-
tion.
⑵ Environment
 This is the dimension of the current 
system that is not limited to legal aspects. 
For instance, the current pooling system does 
exist, but is not a legal obligation. The 
General insurers can, even through the pool if 
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they so wish, get access to global reinsurers 
capacity (or access to Toa Re, would Toa Re 
play the role of a traditional reinsurer). This 
would the situation where reinsurers wish to 
re-reinsure some of their risks towards third 
parties, usually other reinsurers. Such risk 
management strategy, called retrocession［25］, 
allow reinsurer to mitigate the risks between 
themselves, thus being less exposed to their 
own risks, while, at the same time, accepting 
to share some of the risks of their retroces-
sion counterparts. 
 The situation is typical of the Japanese 
reinsurance market, where big local insurers 
enjoy quite huge capacities and thus may 
consider, rightly or not, that the recourse to 
global reinsurance is not so necessary. Thus 
the pooling system, which is a risk mitigation 
that the local players cannot refuse for being 
funneled to them on a reinsurance basis (with 
quasi non-existent retention) and redistribute 
between themselves on a proportional, syndi-
cation-type basis retrocession. Some players, 
anyhow, may show some open-minded atti-
tude towards alternate reinsurance solutions, 
such as retrocession, when thinking about 
optimizing their risk management strategy 
and their risks exposure as reinsurers. 
⑶ Loss ratio
 So far, so good. The current loss ratio and 
the rather short track record for a very 
recent system, in particular when dealing 
with a 10-year warranty provides, rightly or 
not, the feeling (or the aﬃ  rmation) that there 
is no need to improve a system where there 
are so few losses. This is what is said “in the 
market”, but in the absence of transparency 
and public sources, it is impossible to conﬁ rm 
such information.
4.  ANALYSIS: MERIT/DEMERIT/OBSTACLES/
OPPORTUNITIES
 After reviewing in detail what is visible, 
and taking into account such limitation for a 
fair analysis, (since the Pool itself and Toa Re 
wish to be rather oﬀ -limits), one can try and 
make the following assessment. 
4.1 MERIT 
 The current system deﬁ nitely shows 
some merits:
⑴ Institutional
 The current pooling system respects the 
double dimension of the speciﬁ c Housing 
Warranty Insurance, where the risk assess-
ment (inspection) lies within the regulatory 
scope of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, 
Transport and Tourism and the risk taking 
lies within ﬁ nancial institutions, the General 
Insurance Companies. Such design does allow 
the MLIT to be in charge and provide a 
quasi sub-regulatory role to the Housing 
Warranty Insurance Entities, since that insur-
ance line has become, quite rightly, a compul-
sory insurance［26］. Indeed, such compulsory 
aspect allows, to some extent, to enforce the 
MLIT standards to the construction sector, a 
very legitimate priority for the Japanese 
Government. This is exactly the response to 
the aftermath of the Aneha scandal, ensuring 
that the factors which created the situation 
which helped the emergence of such scandal 
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do not repeat themselves. With the new 
insurance system and, would some defect 
appear, a proper liability insurance system 
will provide the victims with relevant indem-
nity through the insurance system. (Or the 
State Fund will be put into action, in case the 
house supplier has selected such form of 
cover for its own liability towards the 
consumer). 
 In that respect, the current system, from 
the MLIT side, seems to plainly fulﬁ ll its 
objective and provide, when justiﬁ ed, the 
victims of housing construction defect with 
insurance money. And when the defect is the 
consequence of gross negligence of the 
constructor or is intentional, a proper Relief 
Fund, managed by the entities through their 
Association is available for providing an 
indemnity. 
 On the institutional point of view, the 
transfer of risk to FSA-regulated General 
Insurance Companies provides the correct 
regulatory frame for the management of this 
risk, like any other insurance risk. In addition, 
the imposition of a speciﬁ c license, among the 
General Insurance Companies allowed to 
operate in Japan by the FSA, ensure that 
such Companies are truly able to provide 
both technical know-how and capacity for this 
speciﬁ c line, thus comforting the Housing 
Warranty Insurance Entities’ ability to 
provide insurance indemnity when necessary, 
for the beneﬁ t of the Japanese home buyer. 
⑵ The State Fund option
 It is important to remember that insur-
ance is compulsory only when the 
constructor has not opted for providing a 
deposit amount to the speciﬁ c Government 
system. As a consequence, cash-rich huge 
construction companies select such deposit 
system, and thus avoid paying the Housing 
Warranty Insurance. There are, numerically, 
a limited number of construction companies 
using such deposit system. 
⑶ Risk management
 On the risk management side, it makes 
sense that the Housing Warranty Insurance 
Entities do not retain a signiﬁ cant part or no 
part at all of the risk they are supposed to 
insure and transfer almost all of their risk 
towards real General Insurance Companies. 
This provides the correct regulatory FSA 
frame for ensuring that the real risk takers, 
acting in such instance as reinsurers, show 
the correct risk governance and ﬁ nancial 
ratios enforce by the FSA, plus the technical 
know-how of excellent General Insurance 
Companies, huge and competent players. 
 The pooling system, providing risk miti-
gation, then proportional retrocession in a 
syndication style scheme, does allow suﬃ  cient 
capacity for reinsuring the Housing Warranty 
Insurance Entities and does mitigate the risk 
for each pool member, a necessity when 
considering that risk selection is out of reach 
for the General Insurance Companies. 
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4.2 DEMERIT
⑴  Housing Warranty Insurance Entities as 
true insurance underwriters
 These entities enjoy an excellent technical 
level, and for sure, the MILT is totally dedi-
cated to enforcing the correct construction 
standard, in the aftermath of the Aneha 
scandal and the Great Tohoku Earthquake. 
But if those entities are strong on the 
construction side, they are not such seasoned 
insurance suppliers. 
 Thus, it is of course wise to transfer most 
or the whole risk to real insurers, the 
FSA-monitored General Insurance Companies. 
But this situation of extremely minima or nil 
retention does not entice those entities to be 
discriminant on the risk taking side, since 
they are entitled, whatsoever, to get reinsur-
ance from the General Insurance Companies. 
Of course, technical inspection is or should be 
(they did not detect the Aneha big problem...) 
a stringent process and the correct technical 
procedures deﬁ nitely reduce the risk dramat-
ically. 
 But technical inspection and insurance 
(and of course reinsurance) are rather 
different business, though they should 
contribute more separately to the same safe 
and proper result. 
 But the fact for the entities to be 
provided reinsurance coverage on a quasi-
automatic basis from the General insurance 
companies does not necessarily ensure that 
the speciﬁ c insurance-minded risk assessment 
will be made, and certainly will not prevail 
against technical inspection when the same 
entity is doing both. 
⑵ General Insurance Companies
 These companies have been invited to 
provide their opinions, during the process of 
creating the new Housing Warranty 
Insurance System created in urgency in the 
aftermath of the Aneha scandal. They clearly 
stated that the then envisaged (now current) 
system has some demerits. The ﬁ rst one 
comment made by the General Insurance 
sector refers to the division made between 
risk assessment (by the sole entities) and risk 
coverage (by the sole General Insurance 
Companies). Indeed, one has to remember the 
core activity of insurance is precisely under-
writing. And underwriting can correctly func-
tion only in the case of the underwriter gets 
ﬁ rst-hand information and the ﬁ nal say on the 
decision to provide the insurance or reinsur-
ance.
 Taking into account this universally 
accepted deﬁ nition of insurance or reinsur-
ance underwriting, we prefer the wording 
“risk coverage” to qualify the situation in 
Japan of the General Insurance Company 
with Housing Warranty Insurance than 
“underwriting”. The main feature of under-
writing activity is for any insurance company 
to be presented with each risk separately and 
be able to assess them through the insurance 
company’s freely defined underwriting 
process. This means, for instance, that it is 
the insurance company total decision and 
discretion to accept or to refuse any risk. 
This refusal should be possible irrespectively 
of the fact that the insurance line is compul-
sory or not. In the case of Housing Warranty 
Insurance in Japan, the reinsurance provided 
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by the General Insurance Companies, to be 
done in a proper and sound manner, needs to 
involve a technically full and relevant under-
writing process, which indeed is the true core 
activity of the business. Unfortunately, in the 
case of Housing Warranty Insurance in Japan, 
reinsurance looks mandatory for the General 
Insurance Companies to accept, irrespective 
of any underwriting process. 
 The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, 
Transport and Tourism is indeed in its full 
legitimacy for enforcing the much-needed 
inspection process and supporting the inspec-
tion companies. This is certainly a central 
feature to monitor the quality of building and 
to reduce risks, in particular with on-site 
inspections［27］. 
 But the technical construction inspection 
companies, certainly wishing to enforce the 
best level of construction standards, are not, 
in essence, true insurers.
 Therefore, one may challenge why it has 
been deemed necessary to turn the entities, 
competent in technical inspection of the 
construction process, into insurance compa-
nies. The Japanese Housing Warranty 
Insurance design scheme itself shows that the 
true underwriting process is supposed to be 
made by the General insurance companies, 
themselves under the supervision of the FSA. 
⑶ What an improved underwriting process 
could be
 In the globally accepted underwriting 
process, the inspection companies and the 
insurance companies deﬁ nitely need to work 
together, but each of them in its own 
capacity.
 The generally accepted design is the one 
where the experienced General Insurance 
Companies (in the case of Japan, FSA-licensed) 
independently design and master their own 
underwriting process and request the special-
ized on-site construction inspection ﬁ rms to 
provide ﬁ eld and technical reports, so that the 
General Insurance Companies can freely 
assess and underwrite the risk, which means, 
refuse the risk if they deem such decision 
necessary. 
⑷ Housing Warranty Reinsurance Pool
 Since the General Insurance Companies 
have to accept the risk ceded without real 
underwriting process the pooling system has 
been design with the eﬀ ect of mutualizing 
and mitigating the risks between the pool 
members (the General Insurance Companies 
which have been granted the proper license 
by the FSA). 
 So the General Insurance Companies have 
to accept, through the pool design, risks 
brought by the competing follow pool 
members, without any pool members, either 
the accepting “reinsurer” or the other pool 
members, being able to neither implement 
nor enforce a real reinsurance underwriting 
process.
 The pool closed-ended syndication design 
also does not allow individual pool members 
to the beneﬁ t of retrocession with global 
reinsurers.
 Retrocession, if used by the Japanese 
General insurance companies, at least to some 
extent, would bring to these Japanese 
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insurers the expertise and the capacity of 
global reinsurance, and provide an additional 
tool for sound and proper risk management.
 The current very low level of claims 
ratio［28］ seems to justify the self-declared lack 
of appetence for global reinsurance.
 General Insurance Companies may seem 
to currently enjoy a good business since they 
receive premiums and seems to get very few 
losses. 
 But they are in any way in a double-
passive situation［29］, very rare for any insur-
ance or reinsurance company, when the real 
risk taker cannot refuse a risk and have to 
collectively back the pool, thus backing the 
other pool members’ voluntary or involun-
tary subscription. 
 The current design of the pool, being a 
non-transparent, closed-ended entity, without 
any known speciﬁ c legal framework does not 
allow the participation of global reinsurers, 
since the participation to this reinsurance 
mechanism imposes to get a license of local 
direct General Insurer in Japan, plus the addi-
tional speciﬁ c license to accept the Housing 
Warranty Insurance risk as a FSA-authorized 
General Insurer. This would probably mean 
that there would an obligation to admit direct 
insurance from entities, which is very 
unlikely in a scheme where true under-
writing is denied.
 Global reinsurance players will not only 
bring capacity (which may prove welcomed in 
case of the claims ratio getting into adverse 
territory［30］), they will bring expertise and 
their possibly stringent underwriting rule［31］. 
Which would in return possibly entice the 
General Insurance Companies members of the 
pool to create and enforce reinsurance under-
writing rules towards the Housing Warranty 
Insurance Entities. The latter would then 
may not get their reinsurance on an auto-
matic basis, contrary to the current system. 
CONCLUSION
 The current system does respond to the 
criterion of providing coverage to the 
consumer buying a new house or ﬂ at. But the 
current design, very recent, has not gotten 
enough time to conﬁ rm its eﬃ  ciency in case 
of hardship.
 The analysis of the current system, in 
particular its lack of transparence, the 
absence of true underwriting and the passive 
risk mutualisation may not create the perfect 
risk management.
 The close-end design of the reinsurance 
pool does not provide the opportunity for the 
Japanese General Insurance Companies to 
beneﬁ t from the capacity, the expertise and 
the global risk mutualisation that the global 
reinsurance companies may provide. 
 In addition, one may get surprised when 
the Japanese Construction Warranty, now all 
stock companies, have among their share-
holders some Japanese General Insurance 
companies, which could create some non 
optimal situation as regards possible conﬂ icts 
of interests, in particular when the risk is 
accepted automatically and also automatically 
mitigated with the shareholders local compet-
itors through the syndication style of the 
reinsurance pool. 
 In addition, one may get surprised when 
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discovering that among the shareholders of 
the 5 entities distributing the Japanese 
Construction Warranty, now all stock compa-
nies, are some Japanese General Insurance 
Companies. This could create some non-
optimal situations. 
 For instance, a potential conﬂ ict of 
interest may arise when the same Japanese 
General Insurance Company, as a share-
holder, may inﬂ uence the said entity to 
accept a speciﬁ c risk. This inﬂ uence may 
take into account the interest of the said 
Japanese General Insurance Company, as the 
reinsurance body of the said entity. In other 
words, being both the shareholder and the 
reinsurer of an insurance entity is a speciﬁ c 
situations that may lead to inﬂ uence the risk 
selection of the ceding company, here the 
entity.
 Another conﬂ ict of interest may arise 
from the pool eﬀ ect: the same Japanese 
general insurance company can choose to 
operate its right for retention for the risk 
that may be considered as the best, whilst at 
the same time, decide to mutualize the less 
appealing ones in the pool, indeed sharing 
such less desirable risks with its competing 
Japanese general insurance companies.
 Both non-optimal situations may be solved 
by bringing the risk, at least partly, to the 
global reinsurance market, where acceptance 
(or non-acceptance) of ceded risk is based on 
criteria which are not exposed to neither the 
shareholding of ceding entity, or mutualiza-
tion with competitors that the pool system is 
creating. The pool being opaque, makes it 
diﬃ  cult to conﬁ rm or exclude any bias. The 
desire for transparency being of course, up to 
Japanese people, market and authorities.
 The positive side is that Japanese General 
Insurance companies are among the World 
most advanced insurers in terms of risk 
management and may decided, sometime in 
the future to bring into action sound and 
proper underwriting. And possibly test what 
the global reinsurance market may bring in 
the ﬁ eld of capacity, expertise and global risk 
management.
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JAPAN HOUSING WARRANTY INSURANCE DESIGN
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Figure 1: Housing Warranty Insurance design in Japan
Source: http://kashihoken.or.jp/insurance/reform/ (last viewd on January 18 2013)
Number of 
Stories*
Number of 
Inspections
Timing
3 or less 2
Step 1. Upon completion of the foundation structure.
Step 2. Upon completion of the structure (i.e. roof for wooden structure houses).
4 or more 3 or more
Step 1. Upon completion of the foundation structure.
Step 2.  Upon completion of the ﬂ oor structure of the intermediate ﬂ oors** (reinforced 
concrete installation for reinforced concrete structure).
Step 3. Upon completion of roof sealing.
* including basement; ** intermediate ﬂ oors are 2nd and 10 ﬂ oor from the ground; 
Source of comments: Association of House Warranty Insurance Entities. 
Table 1: Inspection process by House Warranty Insurance Entities 
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Figure 2: Insurance covers in House Warranty Insurance
Source: http://kashihoken.or.jp/kashihoken/ (last viewed January 18 2013)
Figure 3: Organization of the Ministry concerning Housing Warranty Insurance is concerned 
Source of comments: Association of House Warranty Insurance Entities. 
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Association of Housing Warranty 
Insurance Entities*
Characteristics
K.K. Jûtaku Anshin Backed up by a trading house which sells building material to builders
Organization for Housing Warranty K.K. Longest experience in the housing insurance business
K.K. JIO Corporation
Has its own branches of housing inspectors nationwide and emphasizes 
giving guidance on quality works
House G-Men Co., Ltd. Providing ﬁ nancial services for local builders through its group network
Houseplus Corporation Known to be a top-class housing performance evaluation service.
Source of comments: Association of House Warranty Insurance Entities. 
Table 2: Housing Warranty Insurance Entities
